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      In everyday experience, it seems as if the world is made up of objects such 
as tables, universities, numbers, and so on.  These individual objects appear to 
be self-sufficient things that are what they are independently of other 
existents. If everything in the universe disappeared except my writing table, 
the table would still be a table – not an elephant or the square root of two. This,
at least, is how the world appears to us. 
This everyday assumption that objects are self-sufficient is rejected by 
four philosophers (among others) who in different ways reject the notion of 
objects-in-themselves: Husserl, Wittgenstein, Dennett, and Hegel. Despite their
very different philosophical perspectives, they conclude that what an object is 
does not depend on itself: it is defined by a context of some kind or other.
1 Husserl 
The project of Husserlian phenomenology is to describe experience. By 
experience, he means anything of which we are conscious. By describing, he 
means intuiting experience solely as it appears to us, (phenomena is Greek for 
appearance) as opposed to interpreting it on the basis of any theory, whether 
that be from common sense, from science – such as neurophysiology, or from 
philosophy. Husserl is a foundationalist: he holds that science and philosophy 
must ultimately be based on experience. "We are, he claims, the real 
positivists." So, to avoid circularity, he must not presuppose or rely on theories 
of any kind in his description of experience. 
Take as an example the visual experience of a simple object, such as this 
table before me. What exactly am I given? Despite Hume's theory or, 
neurophysiology, I am not experiencing impressions of colour or other sense 
data; I am seeing a "table." By a table, I mean a solid, three-dimensional object
in a defined location relative to my body and to other objects. Like any other 
physical thing, as a table, it has another side, indeed many other sides. If it 
didn't have another side, it wouldn't be a table. (Perhaps it would be a movie 
facade, although that too has another side.) Don't say that I couldn't be 
experiencing the other side because light rays and retinal images won't allow 
it. That is to theorize. Taken just as given, my experience is of a multi-sided 
table. 
It is true, says Husserl, that this side of the table is experienced in a 
different way than the other side, a difference that we can all take note of. Our 
phenomenological description must include this feature, which he calls 
"adumbration." (From umbra, a shadow, since one side shades out the others.) 
The way Husserl puts it is to say that the "actual" experience of this side is an 
"explicit" experience that adumbrates the "potential" experience of the other 
side, which is an "implicit" experience.2 Don't misinterpret this as claiming that 
I only really experience this side of the table. What I see is a physical object, a 
table, so the other side is really experienced, only in a different mode. 
Otherwise it wouldn't be a real table that I'm experiencing.3 The potential of the
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other side relates to my ability to convert it into the mode of actuality, for 
example, by walking around to the other side. (Don't misunderstand potential 
here as some Aristotelian, metaphysical principle. It simply refers to my 
capacity, my power, to look at the other side.) What is implicit can be made 
explicit. Seeing a table is not as simple as it might seem: it essentially involves 
at least two modes of experiencing. 
Essentially? By this term. Husserl is referring to the necessity that, in so 
far as it is experienced as a table, it has to have another side. Indeed, Husserl 
claims that we can see indubitably that other-sidedness is essential to any 
physical thing given in visual perception. As he would put it, we have eidetic 
intuition of the regional essence of any physical thing whatsoever.4 He is not 
telling us what mechanism allows us to do this; the project of phenomenology 
is to describe the experience of us doing it, not theorize about it. 
Of course, we have other kinds of experience, experience of other regions 
of phenomena.5 Consider the region of numbers. When I experience the 
number seven, it is not given to me as having another side. (Note that I'm 
talking about the mathematical number seven, not, the numerals "7", "VII", 
“sept,” “sieben;” as signs, these are physical objects that do have another 
side.) We can see that it is an essential necessity that a number not have 
another side; if it did it would not be a number. However, when I am actually 
thinking of seven, I have the capacity to experience eight, six, one, fourteen, 
etc. Imagine someone who claims they can grasp seven, but are unable to 
grasp six, eight, or one. An actual number, such as seven, can only be given 
against a potential background of other numbers, of relations between them, 
indeed, of the whole arithmetic, natural number system. The regional essence 
of numbers is different than the regional essence of visual things, but both are 
open to our intuition and therefore describable in phenomenology. We can see 
(intuit) that we could never (necessarily never) experience the square root of 
an apple as being blue.6 
According to Husserl, there are indefinitely many regions, each with its 
own essence: emotions, moral values, social institutions, scientific objects 
(think bosons!), and so on. All of them, however, share one essential 
characteristic: they have one focus, something actually, explicitly experienced, 
against the background of potential other objects given implicitly in 
consciousness, which could be experienced, a background that Husserl calls its 
horizon.7 Without the (regional) horizon, that is, the regional essence, nothing 
could ever be experienced. This is, Husserl says, a characteristic of the essence
of experience itself. 
Solomon says, "It is singularly unfortunate that Husserl, who 
conscientiously avoided use of terminology with long and varied philosophical 
histories, should choose the notion "essence" as a central concept in his 
philosophy."8  What Husserl means by essence is not what Aristotle means. It is
much more akin to Frege's notion of Sinn, of sense, of meaning. Focusing on 
language, Frege famously claimed that only in the context of the sentence 
does a word have a meaning. More generally, the meaning of any unit of 
language depends on the language system of which it is a part. Following 
Solomon, I interpret Husserl's discussions of essence as being about sense, 
though he applies the notion far beyond language to all consciousness. Husserl
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himself frequently switches to speaking of meaning, sense and significance 
rather than essence.
In any case, just as Frege's linguistic Sinn depends on the wider linguistic 
context, so Husserl, when he claims that every object is given with an essence, 
is claiming that every object depends on its regional essence, its horizon, to be 
what it is. The regional horizon itself depends on the general possibility of any 
sense whatsoever, what he calls the horizon of all horizons, or, simply, the 
World. By “World,” he means something like the possibility of any meaning 
whatsoever. His way of putting it would be to talk of transcendental subjectivity
as constituting all possible meaning. "If transcendental subjectivity is the 
universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely nonsense."9
Husserl's thesis is that no object can simply be given by itself; it always 
comes with an essence, an horizon that constitutes its sense. 
2 Wittgenstein 
"Wittgenstein, according to Pears, wanted to plot the absolute limits of 
language, just as Kant wanted to plot the absolute limits of thought"10 and "he 
took much of the framework of the Tractatus from Kant."11 "Now, according to 
Wittgenstein, the necessity that the limits of language should lie where they do
lie is an absolute necessity."12  So, "in the end, his system is like Kant's.”13 
Wittgenstein's project is to determine the conditions necessary for truth. 
First there must be something to which we can attribute truth or falsity: a 
judgment, a thought, a proposition, a sentence, or any expression made up of 
signs. Secondly, there must be something to which it corresponds that makes it
true: a fact in the world. "World" is a technical term that does not, in 
Wittgenstein's usage, refer to the set of objects in our physical world, as we 
might use the term in ordinary English, but to the set of all facts. Judgments do 
not correspond to objects, but to facts. Whatever a fact is, it is not a physical 
object. A fact is anything which "is the case" and is not restricted to everyday 
facts about tables or to facts about molecules in physics. There are 
mathematical facts about triangles, institutional facts about Memorial, 
metaphysical facts about the attributes of God. Facts are timeless: propositions
about past events, or future ones, are true in so far as they correspond to what
was, or will be, the case. 
Following Frege, Wittgenstein claims that what can be said at all can be 
said clearly. By clearly, he means that, before we actually check on "what is 
the case," we can know in advance what facts in the "world" would make it 
true. That is, if the meaning of a proposition is indeterminate, if we don't know 
what would be the case if it were true, then it is not really saying anything; it is 
not really a proposition, despite appearances. One way a proposition can be 
unclear is when the conditions which would make it true depend and vary with 
the truth of some other proposition. For example, "the King of France is bald" is
unclear, for until we know whether or not there is a King of France, we don't 
know what, if anything, is bald (true or false). The central argument of the 
Tractatus is that a necessary condition for any proposition to be clear, that is, 
unambiguously meaningful, is that it be based ultimately on simple names that
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refer to simple objects. By a simple name he means a name whose reference 
does not depend upon the truth of some other proposition. By a simple object 
he means one that has no parts, for if it had parts, their being together would 
be a contingent feature. If that feature might not obtain, the object might not 
exist to be named. Hence, a condition for truth to be possible is that there be 
simple objects.14 
Famously (infamously?) Wittgenstein is unable to point to any example of 
a simple object. Chemical atoms, however small, or Humean/Russellian sense-
data — immediate acquaintance with an impression of "red," —cannot qualify 
as logically simple objects. All the Tractatus can do is point to the logical need 
for such simples as necessary conditions for truth. Plato, as Wittgenstein points
out, got into the same quandary. 
This pure referentialism,15 in which the meaning of simple names is 
exhaustively given by the simple objects to which they refer, is later rejected 
by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations. Much of the first part of 
Philosophical Investigations is a detailed argument against the notion of a 
simple object. On the surface, his criticism is directed at Plato's Theatetus,16 
but the real target, he admits, is his own previous Tractarian position.17 
The notion of "simple," he argues, is not so simple. We mean different 
things by "simple" in different circumstances and for different purposes.  
But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed?—
What are the simple constituent parts of a chair?—The bits of wood of 
which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms?— "Simple" means: not 
composite. And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes no 
sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple parts of a chair'.  ... We use
the word "composite" (and therefore the word "simple") in an enormous 
number of different and differently related ways. (Is the colour of a 
square on a chessboard simple, or does it consist of pure white and pure 
yellow? And is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the 
rainbow?—Is this length of 2 cm. simple, or does it consist of two parts, 
each 1 cm. long? But why not of one bit 3 cm. long, and one bit 1 cm. 
long measured in the opposite direction?) To the philosophical question: 
"Is the visual image of this tree composite, and what are its component 
parts?" the correct answer is: "That depends on what you understand by 
'composite'." (And that is of course not an answer but a rejection of the 
question.)18 
The argument is general: it makes no sense to talk of absolutely simple 
objects dubbed with simple names, in any circumstance. He points out that we 
cannot just point at something and utter a sound — what he calls 'ostensive 
definition' — without being misunderstood. "...An ostensive definition can be 
variously interpreted in every case."19 When I point and say "gloie" you cannot 
tell if I'm referring to an individual, a genus, a colour, a shape or a direction. 
This cannot be the absolute origin of meaning, no matter what Plato, Augustine
or the Tractatus may say.20 
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Instead, still pursuing the necessary conditions for truth and meaning, 
Wittgenstein adopts an alternative model: the game. Within chess, for 
example, one can point to an object and call it a king – an ostensive definition –
but only because one already understands chess. This labeling — giving a 
meaning to the word "king" — works only because it occurs within the wider 
project of mastering chess, and assumes we already understand the game up 
to the point of needing to know which icon instantiates the king.21 
Wittgenstein expands this example into a general theory about the nature 
of meaning: All words get their meaning from their use in a "language game." 
Only within the context of a language game do words make sense.  
"Game," is of course a metaphor. What it points to is the dependence of 
meaning on rules. A positive account of what it is to follow a rule is one of the 
most intriguing — but unfinished — projects in Wittgensteinian philosophy. 
Negatively, however, he argues that following a rule cannot be the same as 
believing that one is following a rule. The illusion that meaning comes from 
labeling simple objects with names is founded on the mythology that I have a 
mental life in which objects, sense data, or experiences are present before me 
and that I make an agreement with myself to always use the word "red," for 
example, to refer to the same red sense-datum. The word "red," with its 
meaning preassigned in this private way, can then be uttered out loud to 
others. But this can't work; my self-agreement is unpolicable, so it is possible 
that every day I could assign a different experience as the meaning of the word
and, as long as I believed I was following the rules of my agreement, no one 
(including myself) would be any the wiser. If following a rule were a completely 
private, mental affair, then there would be no difference between following a 
rules and acting randomly. Wittgenstein therefore insists that there can be no 
private rule-following and hence no private language. Instead, Wittgenstein 
holds that words are meaningful only within a public, social context. 
Nothing is simple. It is not just words, but also things that exist within the 
language game. The word "king" gets its meaning from the context of chess, 
but the chess piece itself, the king as an object, has its being only within the 
chess game. Only within the context of a language game can there be 
determinate objects.22 For the later Wittgenstein, all words and objects make 
sense only within language games, that is, within sets of rules, which are 
themselves inextricably social. It is this social, rule-governed context that is the
condition for the possibility of meaning, of truth and of objects. 
3 Dennett 
Wittgenstein's attack was directed in particular at Russell and his notion 
that we can have direct acquaintance with simple sense-data. Russell's 
position, however, didn't just roll over and die. It is still alive and well (maybe a 
little sickly) and being defended by qualophiles. Dennett rejects qualophilia. 
A "quale" is an absolutely simple element of experience, defined solely by 
its intrinsic quality. Qualophilia is the condition of believing that there are 
qualia. The word "qualia" designates "the ways things seem to us." When I look
at a glass of wine, the way it looks to me is a visual quale; if I taste it I have 
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another, gustatory, quale. A quale is present before my mind but is private and
ineffable. According to qualophiles, when I look at a red object, I have an 
experience of redness that is unexplainable in terms of behavior or brain 
mechanisms.23  
The presence of qualia is the central characteristic of consciousness 
according to qualophiles, the one that a computer could never have. We can 
imagine a computer that could detect red objects as well as I can and could be 
programmed to respond exactly the same way I do by saying, "that's red," by 
stopping my automated car at a red traffic light, by matching the red on a 
colour chart, etc., but such a computer wouldn't have the unique quality of 
redness right there before it, as I do. Conscious experience is not a matter of 
what gets done; it is a certain, mysterious, way of being. The computer could 
do everything I can do, but it could never be how I am. There is nothing it is 
like for the computer to experience the quale red. There may be something it is
like for a bat to experience echo-sensations, but a bat, being colourblind, 
cannot know what it is like to have the quale red, any more than I can know 
what it is like to be a bat. A quale is a simple, ineffable, unanalyzable presence,
defined by its intrinsic quality and cannot be understood in terms of behavioral 
dispositions, neurophysiological mechanisms, or informational processes. 
That's what qualophiles say. 
The qualophile position is often defended by the following thought-
experiment. Can we not imagine a possible scenario in which, perhaps for 
genetic reasons, I have always had the experience of redness on the occasions 
when what you experience is greenness, but since I have learned to call my 
experience "green," neither of us have noticed? Indeed no one could ever 
know; it's ineffable, after all. Maybe the difficulty here is one of communication,
so there is a version of the thought-experiment designed to bypass the 
communication problem. In the intra-personal version, I wake up one morning 
with my own spectrum of colors inverted, seeing red grass and green blood. 
Perhaps some evil neurosurgeon has operated on me during the night and 
switched my input circuits. Is it not obvious, suggests the qualophiloe's 
intuition pump, that the phenomenal qualities of my experiences could be 
radically different even if everything else — what I say and do — remains 
unchanged? 
Hold on, says Dennett, the experiment is incomplete. If the aim is to show 
that the qualia can change while everything else remains constant, then we will
need a second surgical intervention to switch the output functions as well. I will
need my language module to be adjusted so that I will now verbally describes 
the red grass as "green" and the green blood as "red." So, listening to me, you 
will not believe that there has been any change. Similarly, if red used to make 
me alert and green peaceful, our second intervention must adjust these 
emotions so that the red grass will now incline me to peacefulness. If the red 
blood used to remind me of sunsets and stir patriotic memories of my nation's 
red flag, the second surgery must associate these memories with greenness. If 
my typical reaction to the greenness of the grass was to lie on it, from now on 
it must be the redness of the grass which inclines me to this behavior. The 
qualophile claims, after all, that even if a computer's input and output were 
identical to mine, the qualia would be absent. Even talking to myself, when I 
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conceptualize my experience and make judgments about it — these are 
downstream of experiencing, are they not? — I too will believe that what I am 
experiencing is red blood and green grass.  
We could imagine a similar thought-experiment with pleasure and pain. 
Imagine swapping the input circuits for pain and pleasure as well as all the 
output functions related to them, while leaving the qualia unchanged. The 
glass of wine I used to enjoy now leads to a painful quale, nevertheless it 
results in a fuzzy, warm, comfortable feeling, I reach eagerly to refill the glass, I
report sincerely that I am enjoying it, and my own judgment and belief is that 
the experience is giving me pleasure. The qualophile's hunch that the actual 
experience, considered in isolation, still has its own intrinsic quality of being 
painful is now hard to credit. 
Qualophiles claim that they can imagine what it would be like to 
experience pain even in the absence of the functions associated with it. 
Dennett thinks they cannot. If one really tries hard to imagine such a thing one 
will fail. If we subtract from pain our aversive reactions, anticipations of future 
suffering, worries about how the pain may cripple our future projects, 
memories of our suffering in the past, our anxious tensions and hormonal 
responses, then there is nothing — no quale — left; our imagination draws a 
blank.24 
Dennett considers the imagination of such scenarios to be a reductio ad 
absurdum of the very notion of qualia — at least when we imagine them to 
completion. He is not simply claiming that the swapping of input and output 
functions modify the intrinsically defined qualia; he is claiming that there are 
no qualia. The notion is meaningless. Of course, there seem to be qualia, but 
this seeming can be accounted for by reference to the complex of dispositions 
related to the input. The nervous system discriminates the redness of the blood
or the flavor of the wine and these discriminations activate various judgments, 
emotions, memories, actions, words, beliefs and so on. The colour red itself is a
complex set of reflective properties of objects in the world. The experience of 
being conscious of an object as red is the state of the organism when it has 
discriminated these reflective properties and has responded to them in the 
ways in which the organism was predisposed. As Dennett puts it:
Do not our internal discriminated states also have some special "intrinsic"
properties, the subjective, private, ineffable properties that constitute the
way things look to us (sound to us, smelled to us, etc..)? No. The 
dispositional properties of those discriminated states already suffice to 
explain all the effects: the effects of both peripheral behavior (saying 
"Red!" stepping the brake, etc.) And "internal" behavior (judging "Red!" 
seeing something as red, reacting with uneasiness or displeasure if, say, 
red things upset one).25
The simple givenness of sense-data, the intrinsically defined quality of 
qualia, is an illusion. What we have in fact, claims Dennett, is a complex 
network of dispositions — mental and behavioural — which define the 
experience of redness.26 Once again, it is the context that constitutes the 
apparently simple.
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4 Hegel on negativity 
Hegel says, “... in comprehensive thought, the negative belongs to 
the content itself and is the positive, both as its immanent movement 
and determination and as the totality of these. Taken as a result, it is the 
determinate negative which emerges out of this movement and is 
likewise thereby a positive content.”27 
"The ball is red" is a simple constatation that appears to be meaningful by 
itself, something I, as an individual, can just see ("intuit"). For Hegel, however, 
it is not so simple, for I can grasp the redness of the ball only if I realize that to 
be red is not to be green (or yellow or blue), that is, if I refer it to the set of 
alternative predicates that are the contraries of red. And I must do so not just 
as an individual, but as a social being governed by community norms. This is 
what Hegel means by "determinate negation." Let me try to unpack Hegel's 
position.
To explain determinate negation, I need first to distinguish two kinds of 
negation.28 In contemporary logic negation is applied to propositions: 
if P = "The ball is red" then ~P = "It is false that the ball is red." 
These are contradictions in sentential logic. But in traditional Aristotelian logic, 
besides propositional negation there was a second kind of negation, term 
negation: "The ball is non-red." Term negations do not yield contradictions, but 
contraries. Hegel's claims about determinate negation presuppose that we are 
talking about term negation rather than the negation of propositions.29 
Sometimes these two negations amount to the same thing. If I claim that 
the proposition "the number three is even" is false, then the number three 
must be odd, that is, non-even. (Hegel's own example is, "[w]hite is white only 
in opposition to [in Entgegensetzung gegen] black, and so on.”30)  But this is an
exception based on the fact that there are only two possible predicates for a 
number: even or odd. If I claim that the table is non-red, it doesn't follow that it
is green. It might be yellow or blue — there are more than two possibilities. 
Assume for the sake of argument that there are seven colours in the rainbow, 
then these colour-predicates are all contraries of each other. To say that the 
ball is red, is to say that the ball is non-green, non-blue, non-yellow, etc. Could 
this be what Hegel means when he says, "The point of singularity (Einzelheit) in
the medium of subsistence’[this actual red ball before us?] therefore must 
‘radiat[e] forth into plurality. [depends on the possibility of many other 
colours?]"31 Hegel's theory of determinate negation applies only if by 
“negation” we mean term negation. His position is that the real meaning of a 
claim such as "the ball is red," which on the surface appears to be positive, 
simple and free-standing, is the complex negation: "it is non-green, and non-
blue and non-yellow, etc."32
Note that the ball being red (or not-green, etc.) does not imply anything about 
the shape of the ball. Since roundness and squareness are contraries, the ball cannot 
be round and square at the same time. But redness and squareness are not contraries,
so the ball being red doesn't imply that it is non-square. The redness of the ball may 
involve negation, but not a general negation of any other property, only a negation of 
colour-predicates. I take it that that's the point of the term determinate negation.33 
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On the face of it, Hegel's notion of determinate negation seems 
implausible, so let's try an alternative, more positive way, of putting his point.34
You cannot grasp, "The ball is red" if you don't understand that red is a colour. 
What is a "colour"? It is the set of predicates: green, blue, yellow, red, indigo, 
etc. It is not the set of predicates: round, square, oblong, etc. Nor is colour the 
set: wooden, plastic, glass, etc. Each predicate term is a specification, a 
determination, a selection from one of the sets of potential, but contrary, 
predicates. Hegel says, "they are only determinate in so far as they 
differentiate themselves from one another, and relate themselves to others as 
opposed [als entgegengesetzte]"35 Only if we know that "red" is to be 
differentiated from green, yellow, etc. from which it is opposed as contraries — 
but not from wooden or square — can we grasp what redness is.36 The claim 
that the ball is red is meaningless, he holds, if taken in isolation from the 
conceptual scheme of colours, which must include the colours that it is not but 
could potentially be.  Redding says, "The idea is that if, say, the world were 
monochromatically coloured red, then, from the point of view of ‘perception’, it 
could not even be thought to be red. Being (determinately) red requires the 
existence of other non-red things."37
We can imagine an object, the ball, surrounded by balloons of sets of 
mutual contraries from which we can pick at most one from each set. But this 
way of putting it is too static. Hegel would insist on a dialectical dynamic in 
which the original constatation of red as a simple given needs to be overcome 
by actualizing its full meaning through the negativity of the contrary 
predicates.38
This process is of course normative. One could say that the red ball was 
yellow, or perceive it as yellow, but this would be a misapplication of how the 
concepts red and yellow should be used. This "should" refers to a norm, and 
such a norm is possible only within the context of a community. The 
normativity of all concepts depends, says Hegel, on reciprocal recognition by 
members of a community. A norm is, as Brandom puts it,
constituted by reciprocal authority (mutually dependent moments). 
Wherever a norm can properly be discerned, there must be distinct 
centres of reciprocal authority and a process of negotiation between 
them. For this, Hegel thinks, is the nature of the normative as such, the 
only way in which determinate contents [e.g., redness] can be associated
with norms according to the conception of the normative embodied in the
autonomy thesis.39
Hegel's' theory of determinate negation applies not only to logic, language
and thought, but also to reality. So he holds that objects in the world and their 
properties are also defined by negativity.40 It is what things are not that makes 
them what they are.41 But he doesn't mean what they are not in general, but 
what they specifically are not. That is, the red ball is red because it is not 
green, blue, etc. That it is not square, though negative, is irrelevant to it being 
red.
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Hegel's theory of "determinate negation" is a theory of meaning that 
claims that properties and predicates make no sense in isolation, but only 
within the process of selection, of specification, from a background range of 
alternative — negative — options. What appears simple and free-standing — 
the red ball — is always a kind of illusion, like the tip of an iceberg. "What is the
truth is not an originary unity as such, that is, not an immediate unity as 
such."42 What is real or actual is the underlying meaning structure — the 
context — that defines what the object is and which allows us to grasp it in its 
full actuality.43
So Hegel joins my team of contextualists, about both meaning and reality. 
5 Summary 
The contextualist approach opposes itself to the recurring theme in 
Western philosophy of simple, isolated, self-contained objects given in 
perception and intuition. Atomism has been around since Democritus, and can 
be found in Plato's and Descartes's simple objects, in Hume's and Russell's 
sense data as well as in our common sense naïve realism. 
The main point in this paper is that the four philosophers I examine, who 
hold for the most part radically different philosophies, all agree on rejecting 
atomic entities and insist that objects make sense only in a context. For 
Husserl, the context is essence and horizon. For Wittgenstein, context for both 
objects and language about them is the language game.  For Dennett, how 
things are experienced depends on their functional and pragmatic context, the 
set of dispositions with which they are associated. For Hegel, the context is a 
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Endnotes
1  I have been insisting on the crucial role of context in many of my own papers over 
the last couple of decades. I have offered a contextual account of time in opposition to
punctualism. ("The Concept of Time in Husserl" 1990) I have rejected the Cartesian 
notion of the ego as a substance in favor of a concept of the self as embedded in the 
context of a narrative. (“Selfhood and Rationality,” 2003, What Makes Us Essentially 
Different? 2007) I have argued that the functionality of biological organs — their telos 
— make sense only in the context of evolutionary history. (“Teleological, Causal and 
Evolutionary Explanation,” 2008) I discussed the dependence of objects on constitution
by complex systems. (“The Constitution of Objects by Systems.” 2013) Indeed, the 
theme can be found in one of my earliest papers (“Man Learns to have a Soul,” 1971) 
2  “[To all mental processes] ... there belongs that noteworthy modification 
which converts consciousness in the mode of actional [aktueller] advertence 
into consciousness in the mode of non-actionality [Inaktualittit] and conversely.
At the one time the mental process is, so to speak, “explicit” consciousness of 
its objective something, at the other time it is implicit, merely potential.” 
(Husserl, Ideas, 71-72)
3  “It is neither an accident of our peculiar sense of the physical thing nor a 
contingency of "our human constitution," that "our" perception can arrive at 
physical things themselves only through mere adumbrations of them. Rather is 
it evident and drawn from the essence of spatial physical things (even in the 
widest sense, which includes “sight things”) that, necessarily a being of that 
kind can be given in perception only through an adumbration; and in like 
manner it is evident from the essence of cogitationes [psychological 
processes], from the essence of mental processes of any kind, that they 
exclude anything like that. For an existent belonging to their region 
[psychological region], in other words, anything like an “appearing,” a being 
presented, through adumbrations makes no sense whatever. Where there is no
spatial being it is senseless to speak of a seeing from different standpoints with
a changing orientation in accordance with different perappearances, 
adumbrations. On the other hand, it is an essential necessity, to be seized upon
as essential in apodictic insight, that any spatial being whatever is perceivable 
for an Ego (for any possible Ego) only with the kind of givenness designated. A 
spatial being can “appear” only in a certain “orientation,” which necessarily 
predelineates a system of possible new orientations each of which, in turn, 
corresponds to a certain “mode of appearance” which we can express, say, as 
givenness from such and such a “side,” and so forth.” (Husserl, Ideas, 90-91)
4   “[These concepts] ... are distinguished by the fact that they express, by 
virtue of the regional axioms, that which is peculiar to the regional essence or, 
correlatively, express with eidetic universality that which must belong, “a 
priori” and “synthetically,” to an individual object within the extension of the 
region.” (Husserl, Ideas, 31)
5   “Any concrete empirical objectivity finds its place within a highest material 
genus, a “region,” of empirical objects. To the pure regional essence, then, 
there corresponds a regional eidetic science or, as we can also say, a regional 
ontology.” (Husserl, Ideas, 18) 
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6   “An individual object is not merely an individual object as such, a “This 
here,” an object never repeatable; as qualitied “in itself” thus and so, it has its 
own specific character, its stock of essential predicables which must belong to 
it (as “an existent such as it is in itself”) if other, secondary, relative 
determinations can belong to it. Thus, for example, any tone in and of itself has
an essence and, highest of all, the universal essence tone as such, or rather 
sound as such — taken purely as the moment that can be singled out 
intuitively in the individual tone (alone or else by comparing one tone with 
others as “something common”). In like manner any material thing has its own 
essential species and, highest of all, the universal species “any material thing 
whatever,” with any temporal determinations whatever, any duration, figure, 
materiality whatever. Everything belonging to the essence of the individuum 
another individuum can have too; and highest eidetic universalities of the sort 
just indicated in our examples delimit “regions” or “categories” of individuals.” 
(Husserl, Ideas, 7-8)
7   It is thus an essential property of the ego, constantly to have systems of 
intentionality — among them, harmonious ones — partly as going on within 
him <actually>, partly as fixed potentialities, which, thanks to predelineating 
horizons, are available for uncovering. Each object that the ego ever means, 
thinks of, values, deals with, likewise each that he ever phantasies or can 
phantasy, indicates its correlative system and exists as itself the correlate of its
system. (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 65)
8   Solomon, 31.
9   (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 84)
10   Pears, 37.
11   Pears, 45.
12   Pears, 49.
13   Pears, 54.
14   As the Tractatus puts it:
2.02 Objects are simple 
2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why 
they cannot be composite. 
2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition 
had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. 
2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world 
(true or false). 
3.202 The simple signs employed in propositions are called names. 
3.203 A name means an object. The object is its meaning. 
3.23 The requirement that simple signs be possible is the 
requirement that sense be determinate.  (Wittgenstein, Tractatus)
Endnotes
15   Hanna says, “Referentialism holds that all words are names, and that the 
meaning of a name is nothing but the referent or bearer of that name. 
Referentialism, as its name obviously implies, identifies meaning with 
reference. Thus according to Referentialism ‘Fido’ means Fido and ‘dog’ means
the concept DOG. Furthermore, according to Pure Referentialism, all names are
proper names, and the meaning of every basic proper name in a basic 
proposition (whether a basic singular term or a basic general term – a.k.a. a 
‘concept-word’) is nothing but the referent or bearer of the name, i.e., an 
absolutely simple individual concrete object or a definite abstract concept or 
universal. In turn, according to Wittgenstein in the Investigations, there are two
main problems with Pure Referentialism. First, identifying meaning with 
reference to individual objects in the case of singular terms does not account 
for systematic variations in the use-based meanings of ostensive terms having 
the same referent (PI 28–38). Second, identifying meaning with reference in the
case of general terms fails because there are no uniquely identifiable concepts 
or universals (PI 66–71, and 75–8).” (Hanna, 19)
16   Socrates says: “Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream:−
−Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval
letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are 
compounded, have no reason or explanation; you can only name them, but no 
predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them, for in the one case 
existence, in the other non−existence is already implied, neither of which must
be added, if you mean to speak of this or that thing by itself alone. It should 
not be called itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like; for these go 
about everywhere and are applied to all things, but are distinct from them; 
whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had a definition of their 
own, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primeval 
elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a 
name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are complex, are
expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is the 
essence of a definition. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of 
perception, and cannot be defined or known; but the syllables or combinations 
of them are known and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. 
When, therefore, any one forms the true opinion of anything without rational 
explanation, you may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no 
knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a reason for a thing, has no 
knowledge of that thing; but when he adds rational explanation, then, he is 
perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was 
that the form in which the dream appeared to you?” 
(Plato Theatetus 201e-202c)
17   “... Both Russell's 'individuals' and my 'objects' (Tractatus Logico- 
Philosophicus] were such primary elements.” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations, para 46)
18   (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para 47)
19   (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para 28)
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20   Another of Wittgenstein's arguments against simple objects is the need to 
explain propositions denying the existence of such objects. According to 
Hanna: 
(4) Moreover, if the meaning of a basic singular term were just the 
bearer of the name, then whenever the bearer was destroyed, the 
meaning would be destroyed, which is absurd because it would 
make true negative existentials with singular terms into nonsense 
(PI 40). But true negative existentials with singular terms, such as 
‘Moses did not exist’, are in fact perfectly meaningful, although 
such sentences do also allow of irreducibly different meanings, 
depending on their use (PI 79). (5) Furthermore, there are no such 
things as absolutely simple individual concrete objects, because 
every object we can perceive is complex in various ways, and 
allows of no unique decomposition into ultimate simple parts (PI 46 
64). (6) So Pure Referentialism about basic singular terms is false, 
and the thesis that meaning is use is the best overall explanation of
how even basic singular terms have meaning. (Hanna, 29)
21   “When one shews someone the king in chess and says: "This is the king", 
this does not tell him the use of this piece—unless he already knows the rules 
of the game up to this last point: the shape of the king. You could imagine his 
having learnt the rules of the game without ever having been shewn an actual 
piece. The shape of the chessman corresponds here to the sound or shape of a 
word.” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para 31) "[T]he ostensive 
definition explains the use — the meaning — of the word when the overall role 
of the word in language is clear." (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
para 30)
22   I would myself call this position "Internal Realism", but Wittgenstein 
doesn't use this term. It comes from Putnam.
23   The immediate targets of Dennett's attack are Thomas Nagel, Chalmers, 
and maybe Searle. But Russell's direct acquaintance and Hume's 
sensationalism are not far behind.
24   A being with all the behavioural and cognitive dispositions of a person but 
lacking qualia is called by qualophiles a "zombie" — a special technical use of 
that term. Dennett repeatedly rejects the notion of a zombie as ludicrous. 
"Postulating zombies is exactly as silly as postulating epiphenomenal gremlins, 
and so, when a philosopher does it, I blush for the profession." (Dennett, "The 
Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies"177) 
25   Daniel Dennett, "Instead of Qualia," 143.
26   In many ways, Dennett's rejection of Nagel et al. parallels Husserl's 
rejection of Hume. Dennett has studied Husserl, and his embedding of simple 
objects back into a context, an horizon, is similar to Husserl's position. But 
Husserl emphasizes the homogeneity of features in the regional horizon: red 
makes sense against the horizon of other colours. While Dennett doesn't 
disagree, he complements this kind of horizon with a wider horizon of reactive 
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dispositions, not just other colours. Dennett's "context" is more inclusive than 
Husserl's. In many ways, Dennett is more akin to Merleau-Ponty and the latter's
body-subject with its powers of motricity than he is to Husserl and the 
emphasis on the horizons of pure consciousness. 
27   (Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, para 59) Pinkard p. 55.
28   "Hegel’s complex attitude to the law of non-contradiction is a consequence
of his cognitive contextualism and of his associated need to employ the 
different ‘negations’ from term and propositional logics." (Redding, 19-20)
29   "When Hegel talks about ‘determinate negation’ he means material 
incompatibility relations among concepts: the way the applicability of one 
concept normatively precludes the applicability of another. An example would 
be the way calling a patch of paint ‘red’ precludes calling it ‘green’. Formal or 
logical negation (what Hegel calls ‘abstract’ negation) is definable from the 
determinate or material version." (Brandom, 174)
30   (Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, para 120)
31   In these moments taken all together, the thing, as the truth of perception, 
reaches its culmination or at least insofar as it is necessary to develop such a 
culmination here. It is α) the indifferent passive universality, the “also” of the 
many properties, or, rather, matters; ß) likewise the negation as simple, that is,
the one, the excluding of contrasted properties; and γ) the many properties 
themselves, the relation of the two first moments, namely, it is the negation as 
it relates itself to the indifferent element and extends itself within it as a range 
of distinctions; it is the point of individuality in the medium of durable 
existence radiating out into multiplicity. In terms of the aspect in which these 
distinctions belong to the indifferent medium, the distinctions are themselves 
universal; each relates itself merely to itself, and they do not affect each other. 
However, according to the aspect in terms of which they belong to the negative
unity, they are at the same time excluding each other, but they necessarily 
have this contrasted relation to the properties, which are far removed from 
their “also.” The sensuous universality, that is, the immediate unity of being 
and the negative, is in that way the property insofar as the “one” and the pure 
universality are developed out of that unity, insofar both as they are 
distinguished from each other and as the unity merges them with each other. 
This relation of that unity to those pure essential moments finally brings the 
thing to its culmination. (Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, para 115)
32   “Typically, the basis on which I am going to deny your claim that, say this 
table is wooden, is not because I have acquired a belief about some negative 
state of affairs, the state of affairs of its not being wooden. Rather, my denial is
likely to be based on some direct perceptual knowledge of its being 
determinately non-wooden, for example, metal or plastic.” (Redding, 208)
33   “The negative of something is its limit, what demarcates it from something
else, that is, the point where it ceases to be what it is or, even more important, 
where it ceases to exercise the authority it otherwise has. Hegel calls this 
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'determinate negation' to indicate where the limit of something is not simply 
everything it is not (which would be everything else, full stop) but is what the 
item would become if, as it were, it stepped over its limit. (There may, of 
course, not be one thing but many different things that an item stepping over 
its limit could become; red could become green, or blue, or so on, but not 
sweet.)” (Pinkard, 54)
34   The completeness of the forms of unreal consciousness will result from the
necessity of the progression of and interrelations among the forms themselves.
To make this comprehensible, we can in general note at the outset that the 
account of non-truthful consciousness in its untruth is not a merely negative 
movement. Natural consciousness generally has that kind of one-sided view of 
that movement, and a knowledge that makes this one-sidedness into its own 
essence is one of those shapes of incomplete consciousness which in the 
overall course of things both belongs to that path and itself shows up on the 
path. It is the very skepticism which always sees in its results only pure 
nothingness and which abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is only the 
determinate shape of the nothingness from which it itself has resulted. 
However, it is only the nothingness which is taken as the nothingness of that 
from which it emerges which is in fact the true result. That nothingness is itself 
thereby determinate and thereby has a content. Skepticism which ends with 
the abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot progress any further from 
this point but must instead wait to see whether something new will come along
and wait to see what it will be if indeed it is then to toss it too into the same 
empty abyss. In contrast, when the result is grasped as determinate negation, 
that is, when it is grasped as it is in truth, then at that point a new form has 
immediately arisen, and in that negation the transition has been made by 
virtue of which the progression through the complete series of shapes comes 
about on its own accord. (Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, para 79)
35   (Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, para 114)
36   “Clearly Hegel is here appealing to the type of ‘determinate negation’ 
holding between opposing or contrary and not just different terms. ‘Round’ and
‘green’ may be different, but ‘round’ and ‘square’ or ‘red’ and ‘green’, are 
opposed. Plato had presumably intended something like this, but his attempt to
capture this in terms of difference is too weak. Thus, the tomato’s being round, 
say, does not explain why it is false to call it red. Only invoking an opposed or 
contrary property will do this.” (Redding, 207)
37   Redding, 103
38   As subject, it is pure, simple negativity, and precisely by virtue of that, it is
the estrangement of what is simple, that is, it is the doubling which posits 
oppositions and which is once again the negation of this indifferent diversity 
and its opposition. (Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, para 18)
39   Brandom, 173-4
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40   “It is just such determinate negation that promises for Hegel a Kant-
derived alternative to Kant’s own idea of determination by intuition, an 
alternative needed because of his own criticisms of any doctrine of ‘the 
given’.” (Redding, 55)
41   “Thus, in Hegel’s rigorous (but rather obviously nonstandard) terminology, 
the finite is always that which is intelligible in terms of or is explained by its 
reference to something else, its 'negation.' For something, x, to be finite, 
means that it can only be grasped in terms of its contrast with y.” (Pinkard, 46)
42   (Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, para 18)
43   “Furthermore, the living substance is the being that is in truth subject, or, 
what amounts to the same thing, it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the 
movement of self-positing, that is, that it is the mediation of itself and its 
becoming-other-to-itself. As subject, it is pure, simple negativity, and precisely 
by virtue of that, it is the estrangement of what is simple, that is, it is the 
doubling which posits oppositions and which is once again the negation of this 
indifferent diversity and its opposition. That is, it is only this self-restoring 
parity, the reflective turn into itself in its otherness – What is the truth is not an
originary unity as such, that is, not an immediate unity as such. It is the 
coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its
end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment 
and its end.” (Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, para 18)
